Corruption – the abuse of power for private gain – plagues nations around the world. It manifests as bribery, embezzlement, the misuse of public resources, nepotism, and influence peddling. The UN Convention Against Corruption, adopted in 2003, has 192 parties and requires its 140 signatories to implement anti-corruption legislation. Many countries assign investigative responsibilities to a dedicated anti-corruption agency; corruption-related litigation is adjudicated in their civil or criminal court systems. Twenty-nine countries have established independent tribunals or specialized divisions of the general jurisdiction court system to adjudicate corruption cases. In many countries, reform efforts to create specialized courts (or court units) were driven by an interest in facilitating the efficient disposition of corruption cases (which can be lengthy and complex) and insulating these proceedings from external interference.
What is an Anti-Corruption Court?
There is no uniform model for an anti-corruption court and nations have adopted different approaches to defining their placement in the justice system, jurisdiction, and composition. For example, some countries have established independent anti-corruption courts, while others designate specialized divisions within the ordinary or administrative court system. Some anti-corruption courts only have criminal jurisdiction while others adjudicate civil claims as well.
What is an Anti-Corruption Court?
There is no uniform model for an anti-corruption court and nations have adopted different approaches to defining their placement in the justice system, jurisdiction, and composition. For example, some countries have established independent anti-corruption courts, while others designate specialized divisions within the ordinary or administrative court system. Some anti-corruption courts only have criminal jurisdiction while others adjudicate civil claims as well.
Jurisdiction
Anti-corruption courts may have both first and second instance jurisdiction, as is the case with Botswana’s Corruption Court which is integrated with its High Court. In other countries, the anti-corruption court has first instance jurisdiction over more serious prosecutions (such as allegations against a government official) and appellate review of these cases is carried out by the general jurisdiction courts of appeal. This is the model in the Philippines and Uganda. In countries that assign first instance jurisdiction over corruption cases to a specialized division within the court system, appeals are often heard by the general jurisdiction apex court and not a specialized appeals division, as is the model in Burundi, Cameroon, Croatia, Nepal, and Slovakia.
Subject matter jurisdiction in anti-corruption courts may be narrowly circumscribed to enumerated types of corrupt activities. Serbia’s anti-corruption court, for example, only hears cases where the defendant is a senior elected or appointed official or when the value of the alleged corruption exceeds a certain sum. Jurisdiction may also extend beyond corruption crimes only. For example, if a corruption case assigned to the anti-corruption court in Indonesia and Ukraine includes allegations of money laundering, the court will also adjudicate the money laundering issues. Another jurisdictional issue is amount-in-controversy, with some anti-corruption courts being limited to hearing only more serious casesFor example, Cameroon’s anti-corruption court has jurisdiction over graft cases valued at $100,000 and above.
Anti-Corruption Courts Around the World
The 1973 Philippines constitution mandated the creation of an anti-corrution court. This court, the Sandiganbayan, was established by presidential decree in 1978. The Sandiganbayan primarily functions as a first-instance court for more serious corruption cases. Cases are heard by three-judge panels and appeals are heard by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. The Sandiganbayan has appellate jurisdiction over less serious corruption cases adjudicated in the lower general jurisdiction courts. This appellate jurisdiction enables the Sandiganbayan to develop a uniform body of jurisprudence addressing issues of graft.
Pakistan established a system of first instance anti-corruption courts in 1999. This system, enacted through legislation, operates somewhat differently than the Philippine Sandiganbayan. Pakistan’s “accountability courts” are first instance tribunals in both the provinces and capital. They have jurisdiction over all corruption cases brought by the National Accountability Bureau, Pakistan’s anti-corruption agency. Appeals are heard by the regional high courts.
In 2026, Liberia’s president proposed legislation to establish an anti-corrution court. The draft law, which responds to recommendations from the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, authorizes the anti-corruption court to not only adjudicate corruption cases but also to order reparations for collective harm caused by systemic corruption.
Pakistan established a system of first instance anti-corruption courts in 1999. This system, enacted through legislation, operates somewhat differently than the Philippine Sandiganbayan. Pakistan’s “accountability courts” are first instance tribunals in both the provinces and capital. They have jurisdiction over all corruption cases brought by the National Accountability Bureau, Pakistan’s anti-corruption agency. Appeals are heard by the regional high courts.
In 2026, Liberia’s president proposed legislation to establish an anti-corrution court. The draft law, which responds to recommendations from the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, authorizes the anti-corruption court to not only adjudicate corruption cases but also to order reparations for collective harm caused by systemic corruption.
Albania created its anti-corruption court, the SPAK Court, as part of a broader reform initiative to facilitate accession to the European Union. The SPAK Court also has jurisdiction over organized crime cases and crimes against the “state and public order,” including terrorism. It was funded in part by the EU and through support from the United States government. International donor support has facilitated the creation of other anti-corruption courts including Palestine’s Corruption Crimes Court (United Nations Development Programme) and the Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Division of Kenya’s High Court (World Bank). Donor-supported anti-corruption courts have sometimes been required as a condition for receiving foreign assistance, as they can be used to adjudicate allegations of misappropriated funds.
Some nations have opted to integrate a specialized anti-corruption chamber into existing courts rather than create an independent tribunal. Mexico has a specialized anti-corruption chamber within the Federal Administrative Court; this division was created by constitutional amendment. In Tanzania, the High Court has a special division for Economic, Corruption and Organized Crime. In Malaysia, most first instance corruption cases are heard by special Sessions Courts within the ordinary court system; a specialized Corruption High Court was established as part of the Kuala Lumpur High Court to hear appeals from the Sessions Courts as well as trials for higher level corruption cases.
Indonesia’s Tipikor System and Reforms
After the authoritarian Suharto regime was removed from power in 1998, the new government in Indonesia faced considerable hurdles with the investigation and prosecution of cases involving official corruption. In 2002, legislation created an anti-corruption court system in Jakarta called the Tipikor. Tipikor courts were a parallel but embedded system, with first-instance and appellate courts housed within the ordinary court of the same level. Cases were heard by five-judge panels with two career judges and three ad hoc Tikpikor judges. Indonesia also created an independent anti-corruption commission, the Corruption Prevention Commission (KPK). KPK was assigned sole authority to bring cases to the Tipikor courts.
However, in 2006, Indonesia’s Constitutional Court ruled that the parallel Tipikor system violated “equality before the law.” In 2009, the legislation was revised. Tipikor courts were established outside Jakarta in provincial capitals and districts and corruption cases can now be filed by by ordinary and KPK prosecutors. The judicial appointment process and assigned number of ad hoc judges was also changed. Corruption cases are now heard by panels with more career judges than specially appointed ad hoc judges. Critics of these reforms note that they may compromise the independence of corruption prosecutions.
Judicial Appointment
Appointment to an anti-corruption court often confers considerable prestige. Judges (as well as their legal and administrative staff) may receive more generous compensation than their counterparts in the general jurisdiction courts. The judges who staff Madagascar’s corruption court, for example, earn up to twice much as judges in the ordinary court system. Judges on Albania’s anti-corruption court also receive special security details and are eligible for early retirement. The heightened status, compensation, and protection of anti-corruption court judges is especially prominent in countries with a history of public sector corruption and/or infiltration of the judiciary by organized crime.
In some countries. the judicial selection process for anti-corruption courts may be more rigorous than for the rest of the judiciary. Ukraine’s anti-corruption court judicial selection process involves international experts drawn from civil society and legal academic institutions. The ad hoc judges that sit on Indonesia’s anti-corruption court are selected from outside the judicial civil service and are recruited from a special selection process manged by the Supreme Court. In other countries like Botswana, judges from high level courts sit on the corruption tribunal by special designation. Judges who sit on the anti-corruption courts in Nepal and Armenia are appointed based upon recommendations from the national judicial council.
Appointment to an anti-corruption court often confers considerable prestige. Judges (as well as their legal and administrative staff) may receive more generous compensation than their counterparts in the general jurisdiction courts. The judges who staff Madagascar’s corruption court, for example, earn up to twice much as judges in the ordinary court system. Judges on Albania’s anti-corruption court also receive special security details and are eligible for early retirement. The heightened status, compensation, and protection of anti-corruption court judges is especially prominent in countries with a history of public sector corruption and/or infiltration of the judiciary by organized crime.
In some countries. the judicial selection process for anti-corruption courts may be more rigorous than for the rest of the judiciary. Ukraine’s anti-corruption court judicial selection process involves international experts drawn from civil society and legal academic institutions. The ad hoc judges that sit on Indonesia’s anti-corruption court are selected from outside the judicial civil service and are recruited from a special selection process manged by the Supreme Court. In other countries like Botswana, judges from high level courts sit on the corruption tribunal by special designation. Judges who sit on the anti-corruption courts in Nepal and Armenia are appointed based upon recommendations from the national judicial council.
The judicial selection process can be exacting and typically includes thorough vetting for integrity as well as a security clearance. For example, in Ukraine, the vetting of prospective judges for the High Anti-Corruption Court includes review of family members’ finances to ensure a candidate’s standard of living comports with declared income levels. In some countries, judges appointed to an anti-corruption court are subject to regular assessments. For example, the judges on Albania’s SPAK Courts are subject to periodic review of not only their personal finances, but also their electronic communications.
Case Management
Reform initiatives leading to the creation of anti-corruption courts often include a focus on case management. Some countries have instituted case disposal targets. The efficient disposition of corruption cases, however, can be a challenge, especially for high volume, low resourced judiciaries. For example, although the Philippines’ Supreme Court mandated (by way of a court judgment) that that the Sandiganbayan must dispose of cases within three to six months, many corruption cases take years to resolve. The legislation creating Palestine’s Corruption Crimes Court included a mandate that cases be heard within 10 days of filing and rulings issued 10 to 17 days later. This directive was more aspirational than realistic; the court struggles with a significant backlog. By contrast, Malaysia’s anti-corruption court has had success with meeting imposed trial standards requiring that corruption cases must be resolved within one year of filing. In 2011, when Malaysia established the court, the average corruption case took 8.5 years to resolve. The following year, almost three quarters of pending cases were resolved within the one-year limit.
Conviction Rates
Although most states criminalize corrupt acts, these crimes are challenging to investigate and prosecute. Convictions are relatively rare. For example, 80 percent of foreign bribery cases brought in countries that are parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention result in a negotiated agreement. When Madagascar created its new anti-corruption court in 2018, safeguards against executive branch interference were implemented that led to more efficient dispositions and higher conviction rates (compared to corruption trials held in general jurisdiction courts). Before the court was established, only 39 percent of corruption indictments resulted in convictions.
International Anti-Corruption Court
In many countries, the justice sector struggles to address large scale abuses of public authority and overcome an embedded culture of impunity. An organization called Integrity Initiatives International has led efforts to create an International Anti-Corruption Court (“IACC”). This proposed independent tribunal is modeled after the International Criminal Court. The IACC would be staffed by independent expert prosecutors and judges authorized to investigate and adjudicate civil corruption cases. The court’s jurisdiction would be limited to civil cases to accommodate differences among national criminal justice regimes, including different rules governing undercover operations and surveillance. The IACC proposal allows for claims to be brought by whistleblowers and authorizes private citizens to bring enforcement actions in a government’s name (similar to qui tam proceedings under the False Claims Act in the United States). Six governments have publicly supported the creation of the IACC: Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Moldova, the Netherlands, and Nigeria.
Anti-Corruption Agencies
Over 100 states have established a specialized anti-corruption agency with investigative and prosecutorial powers. The impetus for creating anti-corruption agencies is similar to the drivers behind establishing anti-corruption courts – ensuring the institutional autonomy necessary for effectively prosecuting corruption. In some countries, especially civil law jurisdictions such as Burundi, Cameroon, and Senegal, anti-corruption agencies have exclusive jurisdiction to bring cases before an anti-corruption court. Other countries, like Thailand, divide prosecutorial jurisdiction: the Thai National Anti-Corruption Commission handles cases involving high-ranking public officers and low-level officials are prosecuted by a separate office within the Ministry of Justice. Common law jurisdictions, like Malaysia and Kenya, are more likely to assign responsibility for prosecuting corruption cases to the public prosecutor, rather than a specialized anti-corruption agency. In Uganda, the tax revenue authority is a third body authorized to bring cases before the anti-corruption court.
International Anti-Corruption Court
In many countries, the justice sector struggles to address large scale abuses of public authority and overcome an embedded culture of impunity. An organization called Integrity Initiatives International has led efforts to create an International Anti-Corruption Court (“IACC”). This proposed independent tribunal is modeled after the International Criminal Court. The IACC would be staffed by independent expert prosecutors and judges authorized to investigate and adjudicate civil corruption cases. The court’s jurisdiction would be limited to civil cases to accommodate differences among national criminal justice regimes, including different rules governing undercover operations and surveillance. The IACC proposal allows for claims to be brought by whistleblowers and authorizes private citizens to bring enforcement actions in a government’s name (similar to qui tam proceedings under the False Claims Act in the United States). Six governments have publicly supported the creation of the IACC: Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Moldova, the Netherlands, and Nigeria.
Anti-Corruption Agencies
Over 100 states have established a specialized anti-corruption agency with investigative and prosecutorial powers. The impetus for creating anti-corruption agencies is similar to the drivers behind establishing anti-corruption courts – ensuring the institutional autonomy necessary for effectively prosecuting corruption. In some countries, especially civil law jurisdictions such as Burundi, Cameroon, and Senegal, anti-corruption agencies have exclusive jurisdiction to bring cases before an anti-corruption court. Other countries, like Thailand, divide prosecutorial jurisdiction: the Thai National Anti-Corruption Commission handles cases involving high-ranking public officers and low-level officials are prosecuted by a separate office within the Ministry of Justice. Common law jurisdictions, like Malaysia and Kenya, are more likely to assign responsibility for prosecuting corruption cases to the public prosecutor, rather than a specialized anti-corruption agency. In Uganda, the tax revenue authority is a third body authorized to bring cases before the anti-corruption court.